BMBL Stock Outlook 2026: Can Bumble Turn the Corner on Growth and Profitability?

Bumble went public in February 2021 at a valuation that reflected the market’s unbridled enthusiasm for consumer subscription businesses. The stock popped hard on its first trading day, and for a brief moment Bumble was worth more than its much older rival Match Group. That moment did not last. Since the IPO, BMBL has shed the vast majority of that peak valuation — a story familiar to nearly every consumer app that went public in 2020–2021 on aspirational multiples.

By mid-2026, the question isn’t whether the valuation compression happened. It did, dramatically. The question is whether the compression has overshot — whether BMBL now trades at a price that already bakes in failure — or whether the underlying business problems are structural and the stock deserves where it sits.

This piece works through that question seriously, not with price targets or earnings estimates, but with the mechanisms that actually drive long-term value in a two-sided matching marketplace.

What Bumble Actually Sells — And Why the Framing Matters

Bumble’s women-first messaging rule sounds like a gimmick until you understand the incentive structure it solves. On most dating apps, men outnumber women, men swipe more aggressively, and women receive an inbox so flooded with low-effort messages that they disengage. The platform spirals: women leave, men follow because there’s no one to meet, retention collapses.

By requiring women to send the first message (in heterosexual matches), Bumble creates a structurally different social dynamic. Women report feeling more in control. The quality of conversations tends to be higher because the opening signal is intentional. And that experience difference is why Bumble can charge a premium on subscriptions — it has a built-in reason for users to believe the platform is designed for them.

This isn’t a minor feature. It’s the entire brand identity, and it shapes everything from marketing spend to churn rates to the demographic profile of the paying user base. Women who pay for Bumble Premium are paying specifically because the environment feels safer and more intentional. Replicate that value proposition elsewhere and you dilute the moat. Deviate from it operationally and you risk the entire brand narrative.

The company also operates Badoo, a separate app with meaningfully different positioning. Badoo predates Bumble, has stronger penetration in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and parts of Asia, and runs a more traditional “who liked you” discovery model. Think of Bumble Inc. as a holding company for two distinct products targeting different demographics at different price points. Badoo has faced user attrition in recent years while the core Bumble app has held engagement better — though neither is growing at rates that would justify the IPO multiple.

Badoo’s challenges in emerging markets are worth examining on their own terms, because they’re structurally distinct from Bumble’s Western-market problems. In markets like Brazil, India, and Turkey, Badoo competes against deeply local players — Happn in France, Mamba in Russia and the CIS region, and regional apps with genuine network density built over many years. Monetization is also harder in these geographies: average disposable income is lower, local payment infrastructure is uneven, and the willingness to pay for a premium dating subscription competes against a lower baseline of paid digital subscriptions generally. So Badoo is effectively fighting a two-front battle: competition from local incumbents and structural monetization limitations from income levels. The Bumble Inc. investment thesis therefore requires mentally separating the two businesses — Badoo’s trajectory shouldn’t be used to write off the Bumble app’s prospects, but it shouldn’t be ignored either, since it represents a meaningful portion of total company revenue. If Badoo stabilizes even modestly, it removes a drag that the market has been pricing in as a perpetual headwind.

How Bumble Makes Money: The ARPU Improvement Thesis

Bumble’s monetization has three main levers:

1. Subscriptions (Bumble Boost and Bumble Premium) These are recurring monthly or weekly fees that unlock features like seeing who liked you, unlimited swipes, rematch with expired connections, and priority in the queue. Premium is the higher tier, Boost the mid-tier. Revenue per subscriber here is predictable and high-margin once acquired.

2. In-App Purchases (SuperSwipes, Spotlight, etc.) These à la carte features let users pay per use rather than commit to a subscription. SuperSwipes signal higher intent to a potential match; Spotlight moves your profile to the front of the discovery queue for a limited time. These purchases tend to spike around high-intent moments (Valentine’s Day, January post-holiday “new year new you” cycles).

3. Advertising Currently a smaller piece of the pie compared to the subscription and IAP business, but advertising on a platform with Bumble’s demographic precision (women 25–35, relationship-intent signal) has genuine CPM potential. The company has historically undermonetized this layer.

Monetization Lever	What It Does	Target User	Revenue Predictability
Bumble Premium subscription	Full feature unlock, monthly/weekly recurring	High-intent, relationship-focused	High (recurring)
Bumble Boost subscription	Mid-tier, Beeline access, rematch	Price-sensitive committed users	Medium-high
SuperSwipes	Stand-out signal to a specific match	Users with a specific target	Low (episodic)
Spotlight	Queue priority for 30 minutes	Users wanting more discovery	Low (episodic)
Advertising	Promoted content within app feed	Passive monetization of free users	Medium

The core turnaround argument is about Average Revenue Per User, not total user count. If Bumble can grow ARPU meaningfully — even while total paying users stay flat or decline slightly — the revenue line can still improve. This matters because new user acquisition in mature Western dating markets is expensive, and Bumble has been leaning into ARPU growth as the more capital-efficient path.

The risk: ARPU growth has a ceiling set by users’ willingness to pay. In a subscription-fatigued consumer environment — where the average American household is already managing subscriptions for streaming, fitness, productivity, and food delivery — adding another recurring charge for a dating app meets real resistance. Bumble’s pricing power depends on users believing they’ll get meaningfully better outcomes from the paid tier. In a slow economy, that’s a harder sell.

The User Growth Problem Is Real, Not Cyclical

Dating app user numbers in mature markets — North America, Western Europe, Australia — have stopped growing the way they did in 2015–2019. The install base has saturated. Most adults who are willing to use apps to date have already downloaded and tried multiple platforms.

What’s happening now is churn cycling. Users join, go on dates, either find a partner (and delete the app) or get frustrated (and delete the app). Re-engagement campaigns bring some back. But the net new cohort entering the top of the funnel is thin compared to what it was five years ago.

Gen Z behavior adds a structural wrinkle. The cohort that should be entering dating-app prime years (roughly 18–25) has grown up with Instagram, TikTok, and Snapchat as their native social layer. Meeting people through mutual follows, comment threads, or shared content feels more organic to many of them than a swiping interface. The “cold swipe” model may be experiencing a slow secular decline among the youngest cohort — which is the group that dating apps need to continually replenish for long-term user base health.

Bumble has invested in BFF (a platonic friendship mode) and Bizz (professional networking) as attempts to expand the addressable market beyond romantic matching. These experiments haven’t moved the needle materially, at least not to the scale that would show up as meaningful user growth. They serve more as retention features — giving existing users a reason to stay on the app even while not actively dating — than genuine new user acquisition channels.

Competitive Map: Who’s Actually Stealing Bumble’s Users

The competitive landscape for BMBL is more complicated than a simple “Match Group vs. Bumble” framing, and investors who reduce it to that binary miss important dynamics.

Company / App	Primary Competitive Threat	Target Overlap with Bumble	Strategic Posture
Match Group / Hinge (MTCH)	Highest — Hinge directly targets relationship-intent women in Bumble’s core demo	Very high	Expanding aggressively with “designed to be deleted” brand
Match Group / Tinder (MTCH)	Medium — targets broader, more casual audience	Partial	Focus on volume; losing ground with relationship-intent users
Grindr (GRND)	Low for core Bumble app, some BFF mode overlap	Minimal	Own lane in LGBTQ+ market
Instagram / TikTok (Meta/ByteDance)	Indirect but growing — ambient social meeting	High with Gen Z	Not a dating app, but enables organic meeting
Hinge (Match Group)	Highest single-app threat	Directly overlapping	”Relationship app” positioning attacks Bumble’s brand promise

Hinge is the specific threat that deserves the most investor attention. Match Group has been willing to invest heavily in Hinge because it’s working — Hinge has been one of the fastest-growing dating apps globally for the last several years. Its “designed to be deleted” positioning — meaning it’s optimized for actually finding a relationship, not keeping you swiping forever — directly attacks the same positioning Bumble has been building with its women-first model.

When Hinge and Bumble are both telling the same story to women (“this app takes relationships seriously”), the competition for that paying subscriber becomes fierce. And Match Group has more resources to sustain that fight than Bumble does.

The social platform encroachment is different in character. Instagram’s DMs, TikTok’s comment threads, and Snapchat’s friend graphs aren’t replacing dating apps for everyone — but they’re providing an alternative pathway that requires no subscription and carries less social stigma than explicitly being “on the apps.” For a subset of users (especially younger cohorts), this ambient social meeting is substituting for app usage.

What makes TikTok and Instagram specifically dangerous as indirect competitors isn’t the swipe mechanic — it’s the discovery layer. TikTok’s algorithm surfaces content from strangers in a way that feels organic, not transactional. When a 22-year-old watches someone’s cooking videos, laughs at their humor, and sends a DM, there’s a parasocial warmth built in that no dating app profile can replicate. Instagram’s Reels and Stories create a similar dynamic: you learn about someone’s personality, aesthetic, and sense of humor before initiating contact. That lowers the emotional barrier to reaching out in a way that a static photo-and-bio profile on Bumble simply cannot match.

Dating app platforms have historically competed against each other. The more disruptive structural question is whether they’re competing against a fundamentally different social discovery experience — and whether the “intentional dating app” model can co-exist with ambient social discovery or gets squeezed into a niche for users who are seriously relationship-seeking and willing to pay for a curated, purpose-built environment. If dating apps do get squeezed into that niche, ARPU can still rise (committed, high-intent users pay more), but total addressable users shrinks. That scenario is actually compatible with the Bumble turnaround thesis — but it requires leaning fully into the high-intent, relationship-serious positioning rather than trying to compete on casual discovery.

The Turnaround Case: Operating Leverage and Cost Discipline

Here’s the honest bull case for BMBL: the company went public with a cost structure calibrated for hypergrowth, and now the market is pricing it like a declining business. If management can right-size costs — particularly marketing spend and stock-based compensation — while keeping revenue roughly stable or modestly growing, the unit economics look meaningfully better.

Stock-based compensation has been a significant drag on GAAP profitability for Bumble, as it was for most consumer tech companies that went public in 2020–2021. As those early equity grants vest and expire, the annual SBC drag should decline. Combined with more disciplined marketing (targeting high-lifetime-value users rather than raw installs), the path to adjusted EBITDA improvement is credible.

The question is whether “adjusted EBITDA improvement” actually translates to free cash flow. Dating app businesses don’t require massive capex — there are no physical assets to depreciate, no manufacturing capacity to fund. The business is essentially software development, cloud infrastructure, and marketing. That means a company that reaches genuine cash generation is genuinely valuable, and relatively quickly — unlike, say, a chip fabricator that needs years of capex before the margins materialize.

Management transitions matter here. Leadership changes at Bumble in recent years have introduced some uncertainty. Any new leadership team has to re-earn the market’s trust on execution, and that trust gets earned through consistent quarterly delivery, not by simply articulating a cleaner cost structure on earnings calls.

Investors evaluating the turnaround thesis should monitor operating expense trends closely — particularly sales and marketing as a percentage of revenue. If that ratio is falling while revenue holds steady, the leverage is real. If it’s falling because they’re cutting marketing and revenue is declining in proportion, that’s not leverage — that’s a managed decline.

Macro Tailwinds and Headwinds for Dating App Platforms in 2026

Interest rates and consumer spending cycles affect BMBL differently than they affect most companies in a portfolio. Some dynamics worth tracking:

Tailwind: People still date in recessions. Dating app subscriptions, at roughly $20–35 per month for premium tiers, aren’t the first thing cut in a household budget. They’re closer to entertainment subscriptions. During stressed but not severe consumer environments, subscription churn tends to be manageable.

Headwind: Subscription fatigue compounds in a high-rate environment. When mortgage rates are elevated and household debt is more expensive to carry, consumers do audit their recurring charges. A dating app subscription that “I can always cancel” gets cancelled more readily. Bumble’s churn management — how many subscribers it retains month-over-month — becomes more important in this environment.

Tailwind: Remote work and social disconnection. Post-pandemic, social isolation data suggests that meeting organically (through work, school, community events) has become harder in some demographic segments. Dating apps fill a genuine utility need, not a frivolous one.

Headwind: If AI personalization becomes table stakes, Bumble needs to build or acquire fast. The AI applications in investing and platform businesses are starting to reach consumer-facing matching products. If a competitor deploys meaningfully better AI-driven compatibility matching, it could shift perceived value in ways that the women-first messaging rule doesn’t directly address.

Bumble vs. Match Group: What the Comparison Actually Shows

Investors frequently frame this as Bumble vs. MTCH, but the entities are structurally different. Match Group is a portfolio company with multiple apps, diverse user demographics across relationship-intent spectrums, and substantially larger scale. Bumble is a focused two-brand company (Bumble + Badoo) built around a specific value proposition for a specific audience.

That difference matters for how you evaluate them:

• Match Group’s revenue diversification means no single app’s underperformance is fatal. If Tinder disappoints, Hinge can offset.
• Bumble’s concentration means the brand matters more acutely. If the Bumble app loses its cultural cachet with its core demographic, there’s no internal offset at comparable scale.
• Match Group’s scale gives it cost advantages in user acquisition and product development. Bumble has to be smarter per dollar spent.

Comparing Bumble to how AAPL manages platform monetization and ecosystem stickiness is instructive in one specific way: Apple has demonstrated that a focused platform with genuine user loyalty can sustain premium pricing even when commoditized alternatives exist. The parallel isn’t perfect — Apple’s switching costs are higher — but the brand loyalty dimension is worth thinking about when assessing whether Bumble’s women-first positioning creates durable pricing power or just a temporary differentiation.

Three Investor Scenarios: Where Does BMBL Fit in a Portfolio?

Rather than a single buy/sell verdict, let’s map three investor types to this stock directly.

Investor Type	Thesis Fit for BMBL	What Would Need to Be True	Verdict
Growth seeker (tech-heavy portfolio)	Medium	ARPU growth + operating leverage materializes over 2–3 years; Hinge doesn’t fully cannibalize the core demo	Speculative position, size small
Contrarian / turnaround speculator	High	Stock has already priced in substantial failure; any execution improvement re-rates meaningfully	Most viable entry thesis, but requires patience
Risk-averse / dividend income investor	None	N/A — BMBL pays no dividends, free cash flow uncertain	Hard pass

Scenario A — The Growth Portfolio Addition

A tech-forward investor in their 30s, with a diversified brokerage account holding positions in cloud, semiconductor, and consumer platform names, considers adding BMBL for its optionality on a turnaround. At today’s depressed multiple relative to IPO levels, the position size is the key risk management lever. An investor with conviction here wouldn’t size this like a FAANG holding — it’s a 1–2% satellite position that can double or be written down without material portfolio impact. The thesis is that if Bumble executes on ARPU growth through 2026–2027 and the macro environment stabilizes, the multiple re-rates from “distressed growth” to “clean growth” and the stock recovers meaningfully. This investor is comfortable waiting 18–24 months.

Scenario B — The Contrarian Entry

A value-oriented investor who hunts for names that have seen dramatic multiple compression looks at BMBL’s trajectory from IPO peak to current levels and asks: has the market priced in the floor or are there still downside catalysts? The honest answer is both are possible, which is why this is speculative. The contrarian case requires believing that the core dating app business isn’t structurally broken — just poorly managed and over-valued at IPO. If management has genuinely right-sized the cost structure, and paying user counts stabilize, the current price may already reflect most of the bad news. The risk is that it doesn’t — that user counts continue to decline and ARPU growth can’t fully offset it, leading to sustained revenue contraction that makes even today’s lower valuation look expensive.

Scenario C — The Income Investor Who Should Look Elsewhere

An investor building retirement income through dividend-paying equities, perhaps comparing BMBL to dividend ETFs or individual dividend payers, should not own this stock. BMBL pays no dividend and has no history of returning capital to shareholders. Its free cash flow situation has been inconsistent. The risk profile is high for uncertain reward. If steady income and capital preservation are priorities, there are far better choices. For context on what a well-managed income investment actually looks like, a dividend-focused ETF like SCHD — explored in this income investing guide — offers predictable yield and decades of compounding, which is structurally incompatible with what BMBL is right now.

The Metrics That Actually Tell You Whether the Thesis Is Working

Watching Bumble’s quarterly earnings requires knowing which numbers actually matter vs. which are distractions.

Metric	Why It Matters	What You’re Looking For
Paying users (Bumble app, Badoo separate)	Core demand signal; are users willing to pay?	Stabilization or growth; Badoo declines are expected but shouldn’t accelerate
ARPU (average revenue per paying user)	The turnaround mechanism; monetization efficiency	Quarter-over-quarter improvement, especially in Bumble app
Revenue growth rate	Top-line health	Even modest positive growth justifies the turnaround narrative
Adjusted EBITDA margin	Operating leverage progress	Margin expansion is the tell that cost discipline is working
Sales & marketing as % of revenue	Efficiency signal	Should trend down over time as brand becomes more self-sustaining
Free cash flow conversion	Ultimately matters more than accounting metrics	Positive FCF, improving conversion from EBITDA
Churn rate / subscriber retention	Subscription business health	Any data management provides on how long paying users stay

The most important single number to watch is ARPU trajectory on the core Bumble app, separated from Badoo. Badoo is likely to continue facing headwinds, and its declining user base can mask real progress on the Bumble-branded business. Management has been providing this breakout — hold them to it.

If ARPU is growing while marketing spend as a percentage of revenue is falling, the business is doing something right regardless of whether total paying users are growing. That combination proves the loyalty loop is working: existing users value the product more, churn is declining, and the company doesn’t need to spend as much to keep people on the platform.

What Could Actually Surprise to the Upside in 2026

The bear case on BMBL is well-documented and well-priced. What’s underappreciated is what would need to happen for the stock to genuinely surprise:

AI-driven matching features that create a noticeable outcome improvement. If Bumble deploys personalization that demonstrably improves match quality — fewer ghost-reads, more first dates, higher user satisfaction on relationship intent outcomes — the differentiation vs. Hinge sharpens and justifies premium pricing. This is speculative, but it’s a credible path.

International monetization acceleration. Bumble has historically undermonetized outside North America. If ARPU in international markets (particularly UK, Australia, Germany) can be brought closer to North American levels, that’s an organic revenue growth lever that doesn’t require new user acquisition.

Badoo stabilization. Badoo has been a declining drag. Any quarter where Badoo’s metrics stabilize rather than worsen reads as better-than-expected, because the market has been assuming continued attrition.

Share buybacks. If Bumble reaches sustained free cash flow positive, returning capital through buybacks — even modestly — signals confidence and reduces dilution from SBC. This re-rates the stock with institutional investors faster than most people expect.

What Does a Successful Turnaround Actually Look Like?

Turnaround stories in consumer tech are frequently discussed in abstract terms — “execution improvement,” “discipline,” “focus.” It’s worth getting concrete about what the observable milestones of a real Bumble turnaround would look like, quarter by quarter, so investors can distinguish a genuine trajectory from a managed narrative.

Milestone 1: ARPU grows for three consecutive quarters without a corresponding increase in marketing spend. This is the single clearest signal that the product itself is becoming stickier and that users are voluntarily upgrading to paid tiers — not being acquired expensively and churned. Three consecutive quarters removes the possibility that one good period was a seasonal anomaly (Valentine’s Day and New Year’s are natural inflection points that flatter any one quarter).

Milestone 2: Bumble app paying user count stops declining and holds flat for two consecutive quarters. The turnaround doesn’t require growing the paying user base rapidly. It requires stopping the bleed. A business with flat paying users and rising ARPU is a business that’s monetizing its core constituency more effectively — that’s a fundamentally healthy signal even if the headline user number isn’t growing.

Milestone 3: Sales and marketing as a percentage of revenue falls below a clearly declining trend line. If Bumble is spending less per acquired or retained user, the brand is doing some of the heavy lifting. That’s what self-sustaining brand equity looks like operationally. Any quarter where revenue holds or grows while marketing spend falls is evidence that organic retention is improving.

Milestone 4: Free cash flow turns consistently positive. This is the ultimate test of whether the income statement improvements are real. Dating app businesses have structurally low capex requirements — there’s no physical inventory, no manufacturing, no real estate footprint that requires constant reinvestment. A platform business that generates real EBITDA but somehow can’t convert it to free cash flow has hidden costs that deserve scrutiny (typically SBC, lawsuit settlements, or restructuring charges that recur more than they should). Sustained positive FCF removes that uncertainty.

Milestone 5: Management stops guiding one way and reporting another. This is qualitative, but it matters enormously for institutional trust. A management team in turnaround mode that consistently meets or slightly beats its own guidance is demonstrating operational control. One that consistently guides high and misses — or guides conservatively and beats by such wide margins that the guidance was meaningless — erodes the credibility that re-rating requires. Watch the guidance accuracy track record, not just the headline numbers.

These five milestones don’t require heroic growth assumptions. They don’t need Bumble to take market share from Match Group or convert TikTok users back to structured dating apps. They simply require that the business Bumble already has becomes more financially disciplined, retains its paying users better, and generates real cash. If that happens over the next four to six quarters, the market’s current skepticism looks misplaced. If it doesn’t, the skepticism is the correct assessment.

The Structural Risk That Doesn’t Get Enough Attention: Brand Longevity

Here’s the bear case that I’d flag more than competition or cost structure: dating app brands age.

Tinder was cool for the 2013–2018 cohort. Hinge became the sophisticated alternative around 2018–2022. Bumble built its brand moment with a cohort that was roughly 22–28 in 2017–2021. That cohort is now in their late 20s to early 30s — many are no longer active on dating apps because they’ve coupled up, married, or aged out of the target demographic.

Who replaces them? Younger users who didn’t have the Bumble brand experience during its cultural peak. For those users, the women-first rule is just a feature description, not a cultural identity they grew up associating with empowerment. That makes Bumble more fungible in the eyes of Gen Z than it was for older millennials.

Managing brand relevance across generational transitions is one of the hardest challenges in consumer products. Some brands do it (Nike, Levi’s). Many fail. Bumble’s brand was built on a very specific cultural moment — the #MeToo era, Lean In culture, a specific type of feminist empowerment narrative that resonated strongly with 25-year-olds in 2018. That narrative hasn’t aged out, but it has dated. Keeping it fresh and relevant to the next cohort without alienating existing users requires significant brand management skill.

Where BMBL Sits in Sector Rotation Context

For investors using sector rotation as part of their broader portfolio strategy, consumer tech and platform names like BMBL generally perform best during falling rate environments and rising consumer confidence. In 2026, if the Federal Reserve has moved toward easing (or if rate cuts are clearly on the horizon), small-to-mid cap growth names that compressed during the hiking cycle tend to see re-rating.

BMBL’s recovery potential is partially dependent on macro tailwinds, not just business execution. A rate-cut environment helps BMBL in two ways: it lowers the discount rate applied to future earnings (which helps small growth names more than large caps), and it typically coincides with consumer sentiment improvement, which reduces subscription churn.

This doesn’t mean you buy BMBL simply because rates are falling. But it does mean that the macro environment in H2 2026 could provide wind at the back for turnaround stories that have already done the internal work. Whether BMBL has done that work is the business judgment call.

The Bottom Line: A Credible Turnaround With Real Uncertainty

Bumble is not a broken business. It has a genuine product differentiation (women-first messaging), a genuine brand identity, and a monetization model that generates real revenue from users who find value in the platform. It went public at a price that assumed that differentiation would translate into much faster growth than materialized. The market punished that assumption severely.

The question in 2026 is whether the punishment has been proportional. The honest answer is: maybe. The turnaround thesis has the right ingredients — ARPU focus over user count, cost structure improvement, operating leverage potential — but it requires execution from a management team that hasn’t fully rebuilt market trust yet.

For investors comfortable with that uncertainty and willing to take a small, defined-risk position, BMBL offers asymmetric upside if the turnaround executes. The downside is also meaningful if the business continues to see user attrition and the brand relevance question proves more serious than management projects.

For most investors, the right approach is watchful patience: monitor the next 2–3 earnings reports specifically for ARPU trajectory and marketing efficiency ratios. If those numbers show consistent improvement, the thesis is working. If they don’t, the stock’s current price may not be as cheap as it appears relative to the business fundamentals beneath it.

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Related Reading

• SCHD Dividend ETF Guide 2026 — If Bumble’s risk profile doesn’t fit your portfolio, this guide explores how dividend-focused ETFs provide reliable income with structural stability that growth stocks can’t match.
• AAPL Stock Outlook 2026 — Apple’s platform monetization strategy and ecosystem stickiness offer a useful contrast to Bumble’s monetization challenges — what sustained pricing power actually looks like at scale.
• AI Stocks Investment Guide 2026 — The AI personalization angle is becoming relevant for dating apps. This guide covers the broader AI investment landscape and where platform businesses are applying machine learning to improve retention and matching.

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This article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, or legal advice. All investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal. Past stock performance does not guarantee future results. Before making any investment decision, conduct your own research and consult a qualified financial advisor. The author holds no position in BMBL at the time of writing.